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Experiment’s persistent failure in education
inquiry, and why it keeps failing
Gary Thomas*
University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
Natural scientists are relaxed about the multiple forms experiment takes in their various fields. Yet
in education we have for many years constrained our notion of experiment. This methodological cir-
cumscription has been self-imposed on the grounds that experiment of a particular, well-defined
form offers the clearest evidence of a link between cause and effect in assessing the impact of inter-
ventions. I challenge the legitimacy of this assertion and further argue that the model of intervene-
and-experiment is ineffective and misleading. There is currently emerging a large body of findings
from such experiment, and evaluations of these—like similar evaluations from a wave of experi-
ments in the 1960s and 1970s across education and the applied social sciences—mainly concur on
how disappointing the findings from this kind of work are. I argue that interventions are found to
have largely nugatory consequences because the influence of independent variables is routinely
overwhelmed by powerful contextual influences. I discuss the significance and nature of these con-
textual influences and question the legitimacy of the idea that one can test interventions with formal
experiment in education. I conclude that the assertion that formal experiment can be fruitfully
employed may drive policy in unhelpful directions, as models which may be successful in some cir-
cumstances are rejected on the basis of low effectiveness scores, while others in which potential
effectiveness is indicated are unproductively imposed where circumstances are unpropitious. I sug-
gest that a more unrestricted interpretation of ‘experiment’ needs to return to education discourse.
Keywords: experiment; RCTs; method; inquiry
Introduction
Daddy Pig:We’ll start by doing an experiment.
Peppa:What’s an experiment?
Daddy Pig: It’s a way to find out something we don’t know—like how many children does it take
to lift Mme Gazelle.
Children [all at once]:One, a hundred, six . . .
Daddy Pig: You’re all guessing.
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Danny Dog:What’s the answer?
Daddy Pig: I don’t know . . . but we can use an experiment to find out. Who wants to try to lift
Mme Gazelle?
Peppa:Me! [Tries to lift Mme Gazelle] I can’t lift her.
Daddy Pig: Let’s try two children. [Two try but they can’t lift Mme Gazelle] Let’s try three
children. [Mme Gazelle rises]
When Peppa asks ‘What’s an experiment?’, Daddy Pig offers an unusually clear
answer. I say ‘unusually clear’ rather than just ‘clear’ because the deliberation around
methods of experimentation in social science has, I feel, offered anything but clarity.
My position is that social science’s discourse has obfuscated, not helped, the way to
better, more informative inquiry in education research: it has distracted us from our
purpose as inquirers.
In this article, I argue that education, and, indeed, the social sciences generally,
have constructed an unhelpful notion of experiment. Since the 1920s a particular
conception of experiment has crystallised in the social sciences, which is distinct from
the more informal, relaxed and fluid idea of experiment embraced in the natural
sciences. We might call it the Fisher–Campbell–Stanley notion of experiment (after
the major figures in its inception), involving the formal comparison of groups using
strictly set methodological ground-rules.
Why did education proceed along this path of supposing that experimentation was
obliged to assume a rigidly defined form, and what were the consequences of follow-
ing this route? I offer a brief history. . .
Experiment in education: the interwar years
Early fondness for what came to be known as ‘experimental design’ was, in large part,
down to the intellectual zeitgeist prevailing when the social sciences were trying to
establish their credibility as sciences in the early twentieth century. Out of a desire to
achieve respectability in a world where the natural sciences were realising extraordi-
nary feats, and where social sciences, notably psychology, were modestly successful in
emulating them (at least in laboratory settings), educators sought what they assumed
to be similar methods of verification for their theories. In 1923, McCall published
How to experiment in education, which drew on, as Campbell and Stanley (1963: 2) put
it: ‘. . . a wave of enthusiasm for experimentation [which] dominated the field of edu-
cation in the Thorndike era, perhaps reaching its apex in the 1920s’. The contempo-
raneous work of Fisher (1925) offered the opportunity to enhance the credibility of
experimental findings with statistics.
But the enthusiasm for work using experiment proved to be short-lived. As Camp-
bell and Stanley remind us, commentators such as Good and Scates (1954: 716–721)
documented a subsequent wave of pessimism that led even staunch advocates of
experimentation such as Monroe (1938) to conclude that ‘the direct contributions
from controlled experimentation have been disappointing’.
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Campbell and Stanley attributed the disappointing findings concerning experiment
in the interwar years to a number of factors, the principal of which was the lack of
sophistication in thinking about experimental design. This lack of sophistication
prompted them to write their Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for research,
in which they taxonomised experimental design, delineating ‘pre-experimental
designs’—which were taken to be of ‘almost no scientific value’ (Campbell & Stanley,
1963: 6)—from ‘true experimental designs’, ‘quasi-experimental designs’ and others.
Experiment’s second coming: the 1960s and beyond
With Campbell and Stanley’s opus, the ground-rules had been set for experimenta-
tion in education for the second half of the twentieth century. Taxonomy moved to
hierarchy, enabled and encouraged by use of qualifiers for experiment such as ‘true’
and ‘quasi’, unhelpfully eliding vernacular and technical meanings. ‘Experiment’
came to mean a formal comparison of groups in the Fisherian tradition, and with the
supposed clarification of the form that came with Campbell and Stanley’s exegesis,
new enthusiasm was found for experiment, which led to a renewed wave of large-scale
experimentation in education in the 1960s and 1970s. We might call this experimen-
tation’s second coming.
But the new wave quite soon led to a reprise of the pessimism of earlier years, as
findings from experiments in natural settings again emerged with disappointing
results. These setbacks led two of the best-known researchers in this body of work,
Gene Glass and Gregory Camilli, ultimately to make this uncompromising appraisal
of experimentation in education during the 1960s and 1970s: ‘. . . the deficiencies of
quantitative, experimental evaluation are thorough and irreparable’ (Glass & Camilli,
1981: 23).
Glass and Camilli’s comments came after experiment-based evaluations of major
intervention programmes such as Head Start (Cicirelli & Associates, 1969), Follow
Through (House et al., 1978; Stebbins et al., 1978) and Title 1 (Wargo et al., 1972)
had concluded that there were few positive effects from these programmes.
Glass and Camilli were not alone in their assessment of the culpability of experiment
in what many took to be inaccurate and misleading appraisals of the value of early years
and other compensatory programmes. The failures led distinguished quantitative scien-
tist Lee Cronbach (1975) and others to recommend that evaluators move away from
experiment (that is to say, experiment in the Fisher–Campbell–Stanley tradition) and
toward ethnographic methods. Rossi (1987) drew similar conclusions about the experi-
mental assessment of social intervention programmes generally during this period—
from staff retraining, to prisoner rehabilitation, to those in education.
Experiment’s third coming: the discovery of ‘evidence’
Despite the clearly articulated warnings from leading experimenters from this second
tranche of experimentation in education in the 1960s and 1970s, experiment has had
yet another reprise: a third coming. The third coming surfaced out of the call for what
came to be known as ‘evidence-based practice’ (Thomas & Pring, 2004; Parkhurst,
2016) around the turn of the twenty-first century. The new thinking emerged with a
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focus on randomisation in experimentation, with the logic for trying yet again after
the failures of the interwar tranche and the 1960s/1970s tranche being, as Cook
(2001) put it, that ‘none of the most heavily criticized studies involved random
assignment’. Thus, as time has passed, rather than there being a relaxation of the pro-
cedural parameters for the conduct of experiment, they have been tightened with the
move to randomised controlled trials (RCTs).
The implication in Cook’s comment is that the failure of the post-1960s, second
tranche of large-scale experiments could be attributed to lack of randomisation in
group assignment. But randomisation adds just one ingredient to the earlier formula
—that ingredient being the supposed elimination of allocation bias to groups via ran-
domisation, as if allocation bias had been the wicked problem afflicting the 1960s/
1970s tranche of experiments. But allocation bias ought, if it were operating, to have
favoured positive findings about intervention. Its elimination, if it were operating,
would have led to even more negative findings—a speculation validated by Cheung
and Slavin’s (2016) finding that effect sizes are significantly higher in non-ran-
domised experiments.
Be that as it may, and notwithstanding major critiques of the logic for randomisation
offered by Worrall (2007) and many others, reassurances about the benefits to be gar-
nered from randomisation were trusted by education researchers and policymakers
alike. (Critiques of the supposed need for randomisation continue—see Fuller, 2019.)
A new fashion for experimentation took hold (Wrigley, 2018: 14 calls it a ‘cult’), and
with it came new phrases—‘evidence-based’ and ‘What Works’ (Thomas, 2021)—and
the establishment of national bodies committed to discovering What Works—the What
Works Clearinghouse (WWC) in the USA and the Education Endowment Foundation
(EEF) in the UK—which have funded hundreds of experiments. This third tranche has
now generated enough findings for thoroughgoing evaluations of those findings, and I
review the most recent of these evaluations later in this article.
The corollary of the ‘evidence-based’ and What Works discourse has been a focus
on experiment in policy and research funding, accompanied by a renewed taxonomis-
ing and ranking of those forms, not just in education but in social policy generally
(see Thomas, 2012; Parkhurst, 2016). Indeed, Nutley et al. (2013) give 15 examples
of hierarchies or ranking systems devised by social scientists for judging the supposed
quality of evidence emerging from social research. The taxonomising has had a pro-
found influence on policymakers and practitioners to the extent that some forms of
inquiry, which would in many sciences unapologetically be called experiment, are
considered in education research to be not even worthy of the name ‘research’ (see
Trybus, 2004 for an example of the influence of this discourse). The hierarchy of
experiment forms in education research is revealed in the continued use of terms such
as ‘true experiment’ and ‘quasi-experiment’, and, with an increasingly doctrinaire
tone to the discourse, the anointing of the RCT as the ‘gold standard’, atop the pyra-
mid (see Hammersley, 2015).
The answer lies in the substrate
Our conception of experiment doesn’t have to be like this. ‘Experiment’ does not
have to mean the formal comparison of groups. In natural and applied sciences, in
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technology, ‘experiment’ means to try something out, and from this to infer, and to
build the best explanation from one’s findings. And in trying something out, one lives
in one’s environment. One is guided by that environment; one doesn’t fight it. ‘Right
plant, right place!’ was the mantra of horticulturalist Beth Chatto, and we’d do well
to learn from her advice, for a field of inquiry (or a field of anything, for that matter)
must inhabit a substrate that shapes its form.
The nature of the substrate determines the form of analysis. Scientists work with
the evidence and the tools at their disposal; they have hunches and theories and they
draw inferences about their conjectures on the basis of the evidence they unearth. A
palaeoanthropologist, for example, is forced to work with pieces of old bone, DNA
fragments, established knowledge from geology, zoology, anatomy, the technology of
carbon dating and so on, to build credible accounts of the evolution of homo sapiens.
Palaeoanthropologists test ideas and build narratives and formulate theory. To do
this, they don’t need control groups. They work with ‘inference to the best explana-
tion’.
My case is that we haven’t as a community of inquiry learned the lessons of the
past, and the putative improvement and purification of the experiment form is once
again leaving us disappointed. Worse, it has complicated and etiolated education
research—we always seem to be stretching up for some purer form, to the extent that
inquiry is circumscribed, and with that circumscription, distorted and enfeebled. As
Daddy Pig recognised, experiment is, in essence, a try-out to discover something we
don’t know. It involves a hunch, a test and a conclusion in the Popperian tradition of
conjecture and refutation (see Popper, 2002). Seen in this way, case study, action
research and other forms of inquiry in education should validly claim a right to the
descriptor ‘experiment’. Indeed, it is to Campbell’s credit that while he and Stanley
had earlier advised that case studies ‘. . . have such a total absence of control as to be
of almost no scientific value’ (Campbell & Stanley, 1963: 6–7), he later came to the
conclusion that case studies could, if conducted with rigour, constitute ‘. . . the only
route to knowledge’ (Campbell, 1988: 377).
As Scriven (in Cook et al., 2010: 109) put it: ‘True experiments involve pouring
stuff into flasks and finding out whether the result bubbles or turns green . . . They
have nothing to do with control groups of any kind.’ If Scriven’s message about
methodology is not quite as stark as philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend’s ‘any-
thing goes’ (Feyerabend, 1993: 4, original emphasis), it is perhaps as simple as ‘be
eclectic’.
Catachresis and the need for theory, and inference to the best explanation
Near the beginning of the ‘evidence-based’ movement, Tobin (2005) offered an
insight about the intervene-and-experiment model. He suggested that the idea that
one could ‘scale up’ from some experimentally tested prototype should be seen only
as a metaphor. One can’t ‘scale up’ in education, as one does in, say, engineering, he
argued. He suggested that the mere idea that this is possible is actually less simple
metaphor, more catachresis—a profoundly misleading metaphor—conceiving of
practitioners as homogenous delivery agents, rather than as co-constructors of
change. The conceit that one-off trials can offer What Works prescriptions leads to a
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research-informing-practice culture, he suggested, in which schools engage with a
rapidly shrinking pool of educational ideas. Or, equally damaging, it may result in
good ideas being rejected when they may in fact work very well for certain people in
certain circumstances.
This catachresis has its effects at a broad policy level. As Gibbs et al. (2011) note,
the model of investment in early childhood development has been damagingly
rejected by many commentators and policymakers on the back of the supposed ‘inef-
fectiveness’ of Head Start and other early years interventions, as ‘evidenced’ by the
intervene-and-experiment trials of the 1960s and 1970s. But the advice to policymak-
ers from this model of evaluation has been shown to be misleading: a major analysis
by Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2019) of compensatory and other spending using
new and more sensitive indices to assess the impact of programmes and policies in
education and other areas finds that programmes in early childhood education are
unequivocally the most effective: ‘There is a large “bang for the buck”’ (p. 53).
A parallel of this potential to distort influence on policy is seen in research in psy-
chiatry, where, as Bothwell et al. (2016) point out, because experiment-based inquiry
is more feasible for assessing the therapeutic consequences of psychotropic drugs than
it is for assessing the benefits of psychotherapy, the evidence base for drug treatment
has become apparently (but only apparently) more robust, actively shaping the nature
of the treatment field towards pharmaceutical treatment and away from psychother-
apy. Once more, the assessment model distorts the message being received by policy-
makers.
Elsewhere in social science, in economics, we have witnessed the consequences of
pursuing highly complex, quantitative, scientific-looking models which demonstrably
(following the 2008 financial crisis) mis-framed and mis-analysed the situation (Law-
son, 2009). Often, those models were based on experimental research, and Jackson
and Cox (2013) reveal the developing fashion for experimentation in social science in
the twenty-first century, showing the quadrupling of articles employing experiment in
certain areas over the period since 2000.
Jackson and Cox regret the absence of theoretical grounding on which experiment
is based. As they put it: ‘. . . the result is a lack of coherence, an incomprehensible pat-
tern of small points of light in a dark sky’ (Jackson & Cox, 2013: 44). To escape the
‘incomprehensible pattern’ phenomenon, it is not enough simply to be ‘empirical’—
to summon up the ‘evidence-based’ genie (Thomas, 2010). Observations need to be
connected in some meaningful theoretical framework, as Pawson and Tilley (1997)
and many others have argued. Valid conclusions have to be embedded in a broad
range of contextual information that can lead to what is now known by philosophers
of science as ‘inference to the best explanation’ (IBE) (Harman, 1965; Okasha, 2002;
Lipton, 2004), to which I shall return in a moment.
Inferential manoeuvres in the dark
Why is there the focus on a particular form of experiment, now manifested in the
‘cult’ (Wrigley, 2018) for RCTs? This preoccupation with experimental design is
replicated nowhere else in the natural or applied sciences. As Haack (2007) put it,
science is ‘a loose federation of kinds of inquiry’ (p. iv), and ‘robustness’—a word
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often used by claimants of ‘evidence-based’ methods—is not the preserve of a single
form of inquiry. Scientists in varied fields attest to this by using conspicuously diverse
methods and techniques to test ideas in their inquiries. But for more than a century,
educators and social scientists have remained transfixed with what Parlett and Hamil-
ton (1972) called the ‘agricultural-botany paradigm’, copying the experiment form of
one sliver of scientific enterprise used in plant science, a methodology successfully
emulated in pharmacology and medicine.
The logic pursued in those domains has come to be seen as the best and most
appropriate one to pursue also in education and some social science, with the
assumption of some of the proponents of experiment being that only by looking at
comparisons of large numbers of cases in carefully contrived conditions will we be
able to attribute cause reliably. But, as Scriven (2008: 22–23) notes, there are many
ways, outside the version of the experiment so admired by some social scientists, to
go about establishing causation beyond reasonable doubt wherein conclusions are
drawn about cause, using straightforward heuristics and reasoning. From the intelli-
gent examination of evidence, theory about cause is built and rejected or refined and
ultimately accepted. The process is always about inferring to the best explanation,
and it is often the ‘science of the singular’ (Simons, 1980) that drives forward ideas.
I’ll return to this in a moment.
What is the USP of experiment?
It is worth looking in a little more detail at what experiments claim to offer us. Here
I’ll look, as an exemplar, at the proclaimed apogee of the experiment’s form, the
RCT. Remember that the disappointments of the first two tranches of experimental
work in education were put down to, in the first tranche, as Campbell and Stanley
(1963) suggested, an inadequate taxonomy of experiment for the guidance of
researchers, which meant that researchers were using inappropriate experimental
designs, and from the second tranche, to repeat Cook’s (2001) comment, ‘none of
the most heavily criticized studies involved random assignment’. We’re now in the
third tranche, wherein randomisation is taken to have reduced very substantially the
problems of the past.
What, in marketing terms, is the unique selling point (USP) of any kind of experi-
ment, but, for the purpose of argument here, the experiment in its most refined and
useful form (in Cook’s terms), the RCT? It turns out that the USP is all about being
sure about cause and being confident that experiment protocols are adhered to suffi-
ciently strictly to ensure that causal claims are taken seriously. In looking at kinds of
research and what they can tell us about causation, philosopher of science Cartwright
(2007) argues that the best research methods are those that provide the information
you need, reliably, using feasible means and knowing what you know already. She
says that experiments such as RCTs may be able to do this in certain circumstances
(and I agree that there are limited circumstances in which they may be valuable in
education settings—see Thomas, 2016; Morrison, 2020), but may also be very bad at
it (see also Phillips, 2019).
Why might they be bad at it? Cartwright runs through the propositional logic of the
claims: if the probability of an outcome O (say, an improvement in attainment) is
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greater with a putative cause T (perhaps a new teaching method) than without T (no
new teaching method) once all ‘confounders’ (i.e. anything else that could possibly
influence a change in attainment) are controlled for, that is sufficient for the claim ‘T
causes O’. So, paraphrasing her summary of the argument, in a population where ‘all
other’ causes of O are held fixed, any difference in probability of O with T present
versus with T absent shows that T (the method) causes O (the improvement in attain-
ment) in that population.
In an experiment, the assumption is that if T causes O in a subpopulation of a given
population φ, then T causes O in φ. But of course in a large social science experiment,
where impact (of T) is routinely found to be low (see the review of evaluations in the
next section), our assumption is that T causes O, to an extent, in at least some mem-
bers of that population, but—where low impact is found—our conclusion must be
that T does not cause O in significant amounts of others, or that T only causes O to a
marginal extent overall, or a combination of both. Here is the nub of the issue, sum-
marised nicely by Norman (2003):
. . . all these [confounding] variables did not just go away at the flip of the allocation coin.
They are still there, doing their best to make different people within each group respond
differently to the intervention . . . What effects can be identified from such randomised
designs are likely to be of such minimal importance as to be of little practical consequence.
(p. 582)
Stating that more formally, when we are studying a test population, as Cartwright
(2007) puts it:
To test ‘T causes O’ in φ via an RCT, we suppose that we study a test population φ all of
whose members are governed by the same causal structure, CS, for O and which is
described by a probability distribution P. P is defined over the event space {O, T, K1, K2,
. . ., Kn}, where each Ki is a state description over ‘all other’ causes of O except T. (p. 12)
Tying this in with Norman’s commentary, even in causally homogeneous subpopu-
lations those homogeneous causes are, in a social science frame, likely to be highly
influential, attenuating the measured influence of T in causing O. One may be able to
say that T causes O, but because in an education landscape K1, K2, . . ., Kn (e.g.
method, class size, teacher personality and style, catchment, novelty and other fac-
tors) exist and are significant in any subpopulation, T will rarely be shown to cause O
to any significant extent.
Reviewing experiment-based research
And this is what we find in practice. Not only is the notion of causally homogeneous
subpopulations brought into question by conspicuous failures to replicate, as in the
notorious failure to replicate the Tennessee STAR impact of class-size findings in
California (Bohrnstedt & Stecher, 1999), but the first substantial appraisals of nearly
two decades’ worth of work from the most recent tranche of What Works experiments
are now emerging and showing less-than-encouraging findings. Like the appraisers of
the 1960s experiments, today’s appraisers find that confounding variables so attenu-
ate treatment effects that those treatment effects prove to be hardly worth finding (see
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Viadero, 2009 for an early commentary and Pampaka et al., 2016 for a more recent
one).
Highly significant are the most recent analyses of experiments funded by major
national bodies. Malouf and Taymans (2016), in conducting an analysis of the WWC
evidence base on the effectiveness of education interventions, found that most inter-
ventions garnered little or no support from technically adequate studies, with inter-
vention effect sizes of minimal magnitude. They say that their findings ‘painted a dim
picture of the evidence base on education interventions and indicated a need for new
approaches, including a re-examination of federal reliance on experimental impact
research’ (p. 454).
Lortie-Forgues and Inglis (2019) made very similar findings to those of Malouf
and Taymans, analysing large-scale experiments commissioned by the UK EEF and
the US-based National Center for Educational Evaluation and Regional Assistance.
They found the mean effect size of the interventions being evaluated was 0.06 stan-
dard deviations, and they concluded that the experimentally evaluated interventions
were usually uninformative, with a median Bayes factor of 0.56. Particularly interest-
ing are not only the preponderance of effect sizes around zero, but also the number
indicating a negative effect.
There are some positive findings, but Ioannidis (2005), in his classic paper about
the use of experimental procedure (principally in medical research), accounts for pos-
itive findings as follows: ‘. . . if the true effect sizes are very small in a scientific field,
this field is likely to be plagued by almost ubiquitous false positive claims’ (p. 0698).
He proceeds to argue that in any case: ‘. . . one would ideally expect all observed effect
sizes to vary by chance around the null in the absence of bias’ (p. 0700). Working in
the field of economics, Young (2018) comes to similar conclusions, suggesting that
even those interventions apparently showing an effect may do so merely as statistical
and procedural artefacts of experimental procedure. He concludes that: ‘. . . many
experimental treatments appear to be having no effect on participants’ (p. 68).
Commenting on the tranche of experimentation during the 1960s/1970s, Rossi
(1987) describes the ‘stainless steel law of evaluation’, namely that ‘the better
designed the impact assessment of a social program, the more likely is the resulting
estimated net impact to be zero’ (p. 4). In particular, the history of special education
is replete with examples of experimentally tested special pedagogies, all of which have
been characterised by what might be called ‘programmatic asymptote and decline’
(Thomas, 2009), wherein any initial impact, perhaps attributable to Hawthorne
effects, proves to flatten out, ultimately to fall to the status quo ante (Thomas & Lox-
ley, 2021).
Lortie-Forgues and Inglis argue that the field needs, as a priority, to understand
why experimentally evaluated interventions so often find small and uninformative
effects. They offer three possible explanations: (a) because the underlying research on
which the intervention is based is unreliable; (b) because the interventions themselves
are poorly designed or implemented; or (c) because the interventions in fact are effec-
tive but the trials were not designed in such a way as to detect their effects.
Lortie-Forgues and Inglis are astute in their analysis of the nugatory findings here,
with point (a) raising issues similar to those Jackson and Cox raised about the need
for adequate guiding theory. Point (b) brings to mind Etzioni’s (2001) commentary
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on the predictive failures of economists, which drew on legendary anthropologist E.
E. Evans Pritchard’s work on shamanic rainmakers: Evans Pritchard noted that if it
failed to rain, the shamans said that either the rain dance was not done right and must
be repeated, or that it would indeed rain, but just later than expected. Point (c) gets
to the heart of the issue: trials will find it hard to detect effects in the varied environ-
ments of education. Where I differ with Lortie-Forgues and Inglis, though, is that
they seem to imply that it is the specific form of the trials that is at fault. I suggest that
the problem is deeper than this: trials themselves—trials qua trials—are not, most of
the time, fit for purpose. It is to this issue that I now turn.
Why formal experiments don’t work—or, at least, tell us very little—in education
One of the explanations for the conspicuous frailties of traditional quantitative social
research rests in the power law principle—more commonly called Pareto’s principle,
or, in different domains of study, Zipf’s law or the ‘law of the vital few’ (see Newman,
2005). The underlying idea here is that the stability-of-effect assumptions that domi-
nate much social research using experiment are misplaced (Thaler, 1988), and that
the influence of particular variables is pervasive, unstable and disproportional, such
that they will always overwhelm the influence of others. These influences cannot be
dismissed merely as ‘noise’. They are a central part of the social landscape and will
have their effect not simply by virtue of their value, but via their interaction with other
variables, activating or deactivating the potency of other potential determinants of
change.
If one accepts the premises of Pareto’s principle and its applicability in education,
it follows that a few highly significant variables may determine the ultimate effective-
ness of most interventions. More than this, the influence of these variables may
increase, decay or fluctuate with time, making interaction effects complex and unpre-
dictable. Pareto’s principle offers a means of understanding the nugatory and/or
short-lived impact of much education innovation, as well as the inadequacies of for-
mal experiment (in the Fisher–Campbell–Stanley tradition) to assess any such
impact. If most outcomes are determined by a few factors (such as enthusiasm, sensi-
tivity, engagement, amount of help), then these will always in real-life situations
counteract and outweigh the impact of independent variables of interest in experi-
mental research (see Biesta, 2015 for an excellent discussion of quasi-causation). So,
any effects of imposing a new teaching method are likely to be occluded by the influ-
ence of other variables, such as teacher style, school catchment, parent support,
enthusiasm, and so on (the ‘K1, K2, . . ., Kn’ to which I referred above—the ‘causal
cakes’ of which Cartwright & Hardie, 2012 speak), all working to overwhelm the
influence of the variable of interest.
In the worlds of social science, the confounders are bound to win—in Norman’s
(2003) terms, drowning treatment effects in a sea of unexplained variance. To repeat
his warning: the effects that can be identified from experiment ‘are likely to be of such
minimal importance as to be of little practical consequence’. This is indeed what is
found from several decades of experimental research in education ordered or encour-
aged by governments. As Tom Kane (2016), himself a distinguished contributor of
RCT-based research, put it: ‘. . . one would have to characterize the past five decades
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as a near-complete failure . . . despite the fact that the National Science Foundation
(NSF) and the Institute of Education Sciences (IES) have funded curricula develop-
ment and efficacy studies for years’ (p. 83).
Confounders and how formal experiment deals with them
Confounding dynamics, then, are central to the point I am making about the slight-
ness and/or transitory nature of the consequences emerging from the intervene-and-
experiment model in education. Even if one controls for confounders, they are still
there—still, in a real-life situation, working to make different people in different
places and different circumstances respond differently to an intervention. Equalising
the influence of these confounders between or among groups does not mean eliminat-
ing their influence. Far from it.
But, highly important though this is, it is separate from the issue of the RCT’s
claim, as a particular kind of experiment, to control for confounders. There is room for
confusion here, as the claim to control for confounders may well be read as an elimi-
nation of the confounder issue. Clearly, this doesn’t follow. But let’s put that on a
shelf for the moment and look at the claim itself—the claim to control for con-
founders, since this is at the centre of the experiment’s ‘offer’.
Discussing ways in which different social inquiry models take account of sources of
confounding, Cartwright (2011) says:
RCTs trust to procedure; other methods import information. Which strategy provides
most support for a particular conclusion depends on how confident we can be that the pro-
cedures achieve their aim in the case at hand versus the strength of justification for the
information imported. (p. 1400)
Experiments claim to control for confounders (this is both their USP and their rai-
son d’̂etre), while other methods import information to the analytical arena, interpret-
ing the information from the ‘confounders’. Other methods trust the import of
information; experiments don’t. More than this, experimenters actively distrust it: it is
presumed to ‘contaminate’. But as Cartwright goes on to point out, for us to trust the
experiment, we must be confident that it is fulfilling its premises (and its promises), its
USP, by adequately policing treatment administration via blinding and random
assignment, and by using ‘techniques—including large sample size—for reliably infer-
ring probabilities from observed frequencies’ (p. 1400). Higgins et al. (2011) make a
summary of these techniques. If it fails to meet these expectations about adequate
blinding, sample size calculation and randomisation procedure, we should not take
seriously any claim to the robustness of any emerging findings.
Let us look over some of the application problematics which might threaten the ful-
filment of those premises when ‘true’ experiment is used in education:
• Experiments in education are rarely, if ever, appropriately blinded (see Thomas,
2016; Wrigley, 2018). Double blinding is a routine and essential requirement in
pharmaceutical trials (Schulz et al., 1995), with a preference for triple blinding.
Even simple, single blinding, though, is rarely achievable in education research,
with little consideration for the risk of unblinding increasingly considered
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significant in medical research (see Bello et al., 2014). In his defence of the
methodological benefits of randomisation, Cook (2001) neglects to mention the
issues raised by failure to blind, and Connolly et al. (2018) do not mention the need
for blinding in their review of the place of RCTs in educational research.
• Elimination of allocation bias via randomisation is the sine qua non of the
‘gold standard’ version of the experiment, yet the problems emerging from
decay and degradation of randomised samples persist even in medicine, as
members of active and control groups behave differently (see Britton et al.,
1995; Wood et al., 2004; Verv€olgyi, 2011). These problems are inevitably
exaggerated in social research, given the agency of the actors. Noncompliance,
a problem in pharmaceutical research (Wittes, 2002), is inescapably amplified
in social research where active engagement of a mediator such as a teacher,
who may or may not ‘see sense’ in the intervention, is required (Yurkofsky,
2017).
• As Wittes (2002) argues, calculation of sample size in medical trials is complex and
depends on event rates of a condition, normal disease progression, expected effec-
tiveness of therapeutic agents and other factors, and will lead to studies involving
between several hundred and half a million participants. However, in the trials
which are characteristic of much experiment use in education, samples are much
smaller. While Connolly et al. (2018) suggest that ‘Many of these [education trials]
have been relatively large-scale’, involving over one thousand participants, often
individuals are clustered by class or school, effectively making the unit of analysis
here the clustered unit, while the primary unit of inference is the individual, raising,
as Donner and Klar (2004) explain, issues about the validity of any conclusions
drawn. In smaller samples, random allocation does little to attenuate the likelihood
of allocation bias, given the increased possibility in such small groups, typically
clustered by school or classroom, of random or non-random clustering of favoured
(or unfavoured) participants. So the rationale for using randomisation evaporates
in these smaller trials, though this provides little discouragement to adherents of
the method, who can—but do not necessarily—use complex statistical fixes puta-
tively to correct for the issue (see Campbell et al., 2004).
• Complex experimentation may give the opportunity for the setup (inadvertent or
otherwise) of comparisons that favour the ‘active’ group. The temptation to do this
is referred to as ‘comparison choice (or control group) bias’ (Jadad & Enkin, 2007:
38). Other issues of this kind are discussed by Gueron (2001).
• Subjective assessment of outcome (e.g. whether a child is on- or off-task) is
required in experimental appraisals in social research to a far higher extent than in
medical or pharmaceutical research. Wood et al. (2008) and Oh et al. (2019) com-
ment on the distorting consequences of subjective assessment in empirical apprai-
sals, an issue that is amplified if triple blinding is absent.
• There is ample evidence of the equivalent benefits of ‘active placebo’ effects in
social experiments (Moncrieff et al., 1998), bringing to light the likely operation of
Hawthorne effects in positive experimental findings, yet active placebos are seldom
incorporated into experimental research designs in education. Indeed, the whole
notion of control and its intended or unintended placebo effects is a moot one
(Howe et al., 2017). As Pawson (2006) puts it, in social research the control ‘is not
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a piece of apparatus at idle’ (p. 51). Karlsson and Bergmark (2015) too have com-
mented on the problematics of ‘compared with what?’
• The delivery of education interventions is far more complex and open to variation
than the administration of a pill. Koutsouris and Norwich (2018), for example,
show how the same ‘experimentally tested’ intervention was implemented wholly
differently in differing local circumstances (see also Goodman et al., 2018). Their
findings validate Tobin’s (2005) and Biesta’s (2015) observations that teachers are
co-constructors of change, not identical delivery agents.
Face validity for the experiment, then, comes from the supposed technical robust-
ness of this kind of research, which elevates its status among both lay and expert users
of research (Cowen, 2019). It is, however, as vulnerable to distortion as any other
kind of research.
Agricultural/botany experiments are not the only fruit
As Cartwright suggests, the agricultural/botany form of the experiment is not the only
way of identifying cause. She says that the proclaimed attribute of cause-establish-
ment is sometimes, but only sometimes, a property of the experiment, but this quality
is not unique to work using experiment. She gives examples of other forms of cause-
establishment, including economists’ use of modelling to estimate the degree to
which one factor predicts another in a given population (‘probabilistic/Granger
causality’), where, given the right assumptions, results can legitimately imply causal
conclusions.
Scriven (2008: 22–23) concurs. In explaining a process he calls ‘general elimina-
tion methodology’ (GEM), he describes something very similar to IBE. As exam-
ples of analysis where GEM is involved, he suggests that the identification of
causal route can come from processes as simple as direct critical observation, with
direct or simple inductive inference, as in much astronomy, autopsy or engineering
breakdown. He also notes the significance of inference based on use of analogy or
theory, as in geology. He asserts that inference comes quite validly also from sim-
ple direct manipulation, whether it is in the laboratory or the kitchen. Science also
makes valid inferences from what he calls ‘natural experiments’, as in meteorology
and epidemiology.
In the simplicity of this process, Scriven coincides with statistician David Freed-
man (2008), who talks of causal process observations (CPOs) (and in the similarities
between CPO, GEM and IBE it seems that the same process has been recognised
independently many times over by methodologists, each giving it their own signifier).
Freedman stresses the central role of qualitative reasoning and insight in iconic medi-
cal breakthroughs.
Okasha (2002) offers two classic case studies of IBE which demonstrate how the
form of the inquiry is fashioned to the shape of the inquiry domain. Darwin and Ein-
stein, in their intimations about causation with regard to, respectively, evolution and
Brownian motion, each used reasoning about potential explanations, and each
offered a more plausible explanation than any which had been offered hitherto. No
one said to them, ‘That’s all very well, but where’s your controlled experiment?’ Their
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explanations explained the world satisfactorily and elegantly, employing evidence and
testing ideas in the service of theory.
Even without the control characteristics of agricultural/botany experimentation, it
is clear from the examples that Cartwright, Scriven, Freedman and Okasha use that it
is possible to draw perfectly valid inferences without the use of controlled experimen-
tation. Much research in the natural sciences is ‘singular’, using ingenuity, logic and
systematic inquiry. But such inquiry is nevertheless, in those sciences, unproblemati-
cally seen as ‘experiment’ (see Thagard, 1998). It involves building a narrative about
explanation with perspicacity, intelligence and ‘disciplined eclecticism’ (Merton,
1976: 169). Its experiment method (‘design’ is too strong a word) has little in com-
mon with the experiment methods used in agriculture and pharmaceutical testing,
and embraced formulaically in each of the waves of experimental inquiry in education
that I outlined earlier.
To use IBE in any social science, one must make sense of the whole—not by elimi-
nating or controlling for variables of interest, but rather by retaining the fibres that
bind an explanatory narrative. Those fibres concern time, place, meaning, intention
and much more, all interrelating. We have to use these and combine them with our
existing knowledge. IBE is entirely in tune with the realist evaluation of Pawson and
Tilley (1997) in asking not ‘What works?’, but rather ‘What works for whom in what
circumstances and in what respects, and how?’ Whether it’s called action research,
case study, ethnography or something else, much supposedly non-experiment educa-
tion inquiry does this kind of thing.
Indeed, much of the most significant and impactful education inquiry of the last 50
years is characterised by the retention of these binding fibres. Look, for example, at
Paul Willis’s (1993) Learning to labor, Harry Wolcott’s (1978) The man in the princi-
pal’s office or Stephen Ball’s (1981) Beachside Comprehensive. In each, the researcher
observes the effects of naturally occurring changes, triangulating forms of data collec-
tion and forms of analysis to emerge with invaluable insights about the workings of
schools. It seems inappropriate to me to exclude these inquiries from the designation
‘experiment’: in essence, the working methods of these researchers are akin to those
of most scientists, whether they be astrophysicists, epidemiologists, meteorologists,
palaeoanthropologists or zoologists.
For both the teacher and the natural scientist, using a mix of methods of inquiry—
Haack’s (2007) ‘loose federation of kinds of inquiry’ (p. iv)—comes naturally, as long
as certain shibboleths of experiment methodology in the Fisher–Campbell–Stanley tra-
dition are relinquished. There is much to be gained from returning to more straightfor-
wardly appropriate ideas of what might constitute an experiment in education inquiry.
Conclusion
I began this article with a quotation from a children’s cartoon, offering an ultra-simple
commentary on what constitutes an experiment. Ultra-simple, but not simplistic:
Daddy Pig’s exposition is wholly in tune with contemporary thinking on the nature of
scientific inquiry. My point is that there has been an over-development in the sense of
what an experiment might be in education. The problem has been that some com-
mentators have succeeded in sequestering understanding of experiment in the
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protocols of one narrow branch of experimentation—and by this I don’t simply mean
RCTs; I mean experimentation understood as the formal comparison of groups
(which, of course, includes RCTs). This, I have argued, is illegitimate, asserting
validity by affiliating itself with successful inquiry in other, wholly unrelated fields,
and at the same time distracting us from what a simple experiment—a systematised
conjecture and refutation—can be and what it can do. A preoccupation with what is
taken inappropriately to be ‘proper’ experiment encourages a detour around some of
the most potent ingredients of inquiry in education: the reservoirs of knowledge that
practitioners have by virtue of their experience.
Scientists are catholic in their attitude to inquiry and experiment—their attitude to
inquiry is fluid, flexible, protean. And their work is successful: I gave the example of
the methodological eclecticism of palaeoanthropology earlier . . . and huge strides
have been made in palaeoanthropology and in most sciences in recent years. But few
would claim similar strides in education science. Indeed, the evaluations reviewed
here from the most recent wave of work using experiment to discover What Works
mirror those from the 1960s/1970s and the interwar years. They suggest that the con-
temporary incarnation of this genre of work has delivered very little, with increasing
concern on both sides of the Atlantic about the apparent ineffectiveness of experi-
mentally assessed interventions. As economist Young (2018) put it of the disappoint-
ing findings of the intervene-and-experiment paradigm in a parallel applied social
science field: ‘The fact that in so many cases there do not appear to be any (at least)
statistically significant effects is, in many respects, much more stimulating than the
confirmation of pre-existing beliefs’ (p. 68).
Randomisation, the proffered solution to the problems of the 1960s/1970s tranche
of experiments, in reality provides no meaningful change. My contention is that what
I have called the ‘third wave’ of randomised experiments—just like the second, mainly
unrandomised wave in the 1960s and 1970s—is yielding ‘small and uninformative
effects’ (Lortie-Forgues & Inglis, 2019) because this model of intervene-and-test
using the protocols of a particular kind of experiment is, in education, flawed, unable
to meet this branch of experimentation’s own design expectations and unwilling to
take seriously the significance of confounders which vitiate the legitimacy of its find-
ings. This flawed rendition of experiment is giving misleading policy advice as models
for change which may be successful in some circumstances are rejected on the basis of
low effectiveness scores, while others in which potential effectiveness is indicated are
unproductively imposed where circumstances are unpropitious.
I suggest that a more unrestricted interpretation of ‘experiment’ needs to return to
education discourse.
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